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Spam has been a major tool for criminals to conduct illegal activities on the Internet, such
as stealing sensitive information, selling counterfeit goods, distributing malware, etc. The
astronomical amount of spam data has rendered its manual analysis impractical. Moreover,
most of the current techniques are either too complex to be applied on a large amount of
data or miss the extraction of vital security insights for forensic purposes. In this paper, we
elaborate a software framework for spam campaign detection, analysis and investigation.
The proposed framework identiﬁes spam campaigns on-the-ﬂy. Additionally, it labels and
scores the campaigns as well as gathers various information about them. The elaborated
framework provides law enforcement ofﬁcials with a powerful platform to conduct in-
vestigations on cyber-based criminal activities.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
Electronic mail, or most commonly known as email, is
ubiquitous and so is its abusive usage. Spam emails affect
millions of users, waste invaluable resources and have been
a burden to the email systems. For instance, according to
Symantec Intelligence Report, the global ratio of spam in
email trafﬁc is 71.9% (Symantec Intelligence Report, 2013).
Furthermore, adversaries have taken advantage of the
ability to send countless emails anonymously, at the speed
of light, to carry on vicious activities (e.g., advertising of
fake goods or medications, scams causing ﬁnancial losses)
or even more severely, to commit cyber crimes (e.g., child
pornography, identity theft, phishing and malware distri-
bution). Consequently, spam emails contain priceless cyber
security intelligence, which may unveil the world of cyber
criminals.from the Canadian
ion (CRTC).
ier Ltd on behalf of DFRWSSpam data has been used extensively in various studies
to detect and investigate cyber threats such as botnets
(Zhuang et al., 2008; Xie et al., 2008; John et al., 2009;
Pathak et al., 2009; Thonnard and Dacier, 2011; Stringhini
et al., 2011) and phishing attacks (Fette et al., 2007;
Bergholz et al., 2008; Moore et al., 2009; Bergholz et al.,
2010). Moreover, the accessibility of various data sources,
which can be correlated to complement their incomplete-
ness, has brought new opportunities and challenges to re-
searchers. Unfortunately, most studies either use a single
data source or work on a static spam data that is collected
during a speciﬁc time frame (Pitsillidis et al., 2012). More
importantly, spammers have been constantly modernizing
their arsenals to defeat the anti-spam efforts. Spamming
techniques have evolved remarkably from simple programs
to sophisticated spamming software, which disseminate
template-generated spam through a network of compro-
mised machines. Botnet-disseminated spam emails are
usually orchestrated into large-scale campaigns and act as
the pivotal instrument for several cyber-based criminal
activities. As a consequence, it is critical to perform an
analysis of spam data, especially spam campaigns, for the. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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the stunning number of spam emails, it is implausible to
analyze them manually. Therefore, cyber-crime in-
vestigators need automatic techniques and tools to
accomplish this task.
In this research, we aim at elaborating methodologies
for spam campaign detection, analysis and investigation.
We also emphasize the importance of correlating different
data sources to reveal spam campaign characteristics. More
precisely, we propose a framework that: (1) Consolidates
spam emails into campaigns. (2) Labels spam campaigns by
generating related topics for each campaign from Wikipe-
dia data. (3) Correlates different data sources, namely
passive DNS, malware, WHOIS information and geo-
location, to provide more insights into spam campaign
characteristics. (4) Scores spam campaigns based on several
customizable criteria.
The identiﬁcation of spam campaigns is a crucial step for
analyzing spammers' strategies for the following reasons.
First, the amount of spam data is astronomical, and
analyzing all spam messages is costly and almost impos-
sible. Hence, clustering spam data into campaigns reduces
signiﬁcantly the amount of data to be analyzed, while
maintaining their key characteristics. Second, because of
the characteristics of spam, spammessages are usually sent
in bulk with speciﬁc purposes. Hence, by clustering spam
messages into campaigns, we can extract relevant insights
that can help investigators understand how spammers
obfuscate and disseminate their messages. Labeling spam
campaigns and correlating different data sources reveal the
characteristics of the campaigns and therefore, signiﬁcantly
increase the effectiveness of an investigation. Moreover,
scoring spam campaigns helps investigators concentrate on
campaigns that cause more damage (e.g., malware distri-
bution or phishing).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we present the related work. We discuss existing
techniques for detecting spam campaigns in Section 3. In
Section 4, we present our framework. Experimental results
are presented in Section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section 6.
Related work
Several approaches for clustering spam emails into
groups have been proposed in the literature:
URL-based spam email clustering
In this category, spam emails are clustered using fea-
tures such as the embedded URLs or the source IP addresses
of spam emails. F. Li et al. (Li and Hsieh, 2006) propose an
approach for clustering spam emails based on identical
URLs. The approach also uses the amount of money
mentioned inside the content of the email as an extra
feature of the cluster. Xie et al. (2008) propose AutoRE, a
framework that detects botnet hosts by signatures that are
generated from URLs embedded in email bodies. Both of
these URL-based clustering approaches are very efﬁcient in
terms of performance and number of false positives.
However, spammers can easily evade such techniquesusing dynamic source IP addresses, URL shorten services or
polymorphic URLs.
Spam email clustering using text mining methods
Zhuang et al. (2008) develop techniques to unveil bot-
nets and their characteristics using spam traces. Spam
emails are clustered together into campaigns using shin-
gling algorithm (Broder et al., 1997). The relationship be-
tween IP addresses determines if the campaigns are
originated from the same botnet. In Qian et al. (2010), Qian
et al. design an unsupervised, online spam campaign
detection, namely SpamCampaignAssassin (SCA), and apply
extracted campaign signatures for spam ﬁltering. SCA uti-
lizes a text-mining framework built on Latent Semantic
Analysis (LSA) (Landauer et al., 1998) to detect campaigns.
Nevertheless, template-generated spam and scalability
render text mining ineffective.
Spam email clustering using web pages retrieved from
embedded URLs
Anderson et al. (2007) propose a technique called
spamscatter that followsembeddedURLs inside spamemails,
renders and clusters the websites into scams using image
shingling. Konte et al. (2009) analyze the scam hosting
infrastructure. The authors extract scam campaigns by clus-
tering web pages retrieved from URLs inside spam emails
using different heuristic methods. Even though URL content
provides sound results, scalability is also an issue. More
importantly, actively crawling embedded URLs may alert
spammers and expose the spamtraps used to collect data.
Spam email clustering based on email content
Wei et al. (2008) propose an approach based on the
agglomerative hierarchical clustering algorithm and the
connected components with weighted edges model to
cluster spam emails. Only spam emails used for advertising
are tested by the authors. In Calais et al. (2008), Calais et al.
introduce a spam campaign identiﬁcation technique based
on frequent-pattern tree (FP-Tree) (Han et al., 2000, 2004).
Spam campaigns are identiﬁed by pointing out nodes that
have a signiﬁcant increase in the number of children. An
advantage of this proposed technique is that it can detect
obfuscated parts of spam emails naturally without prior
knowledge. In anotherwork (Guerra et al., 2008), Calais et al.
brieﬂy present Spam Miner, a platform for detecting and
characterizing spam campaigns. Kanich et al. (2009) analyze
spam campaigns using a parasitic inﬁltration of an existing
botnet's infrastructure to measure spam delivery, click-
through and conversion. Haider and Scheffer (2009) apply
Bayesian hierarchical clustering (Heller and Ghahramani,
2005) to group spam messages into campaigns. The au-
thors develop a generative model for clustering binary vec-
tors based on a transformation of the input vectors.
Spam campaign detection techniques
A straightforward approach for grouping spam emails
into campaigns is to calculate the distances between spam
S. Dinh et al. / Digital Investigation 12 (2015) S12eS21S14emails and then apply a clustering technique, which gener-
ates clusters of emails that are “close” to each other. The
distancebetween twoemails canbemeasuredbycomputing
the similarity of their textual contents, e.g., w-shingling and
the Jaccard coefﬁcient (Broder et al., 1997), Context Triggered
Piecewise Hashing (CTPH) (Kornblum, 2006) or Locality-Sen-
sitive Hashing (LSH) (Damiani et al., 2004). The ﬁrst metric
has been used in many studies (Zhuang et al., 2008;
Anderson et al., 2007; Gao et al., 2010) while the second
and the third metrics are originally utilized for spam miti-
gation (spamsum, 2013; Damiani et al., 2004). However, one
disadvantage of this approach is its non-scalability because
of the enormous amount of spam emails to be analyzed.
Additionally, the use of templates for content generation and
numerous obfuscation techniques has remarkably increased
the diversity of spam emails in one campaign. For these
reasons, clustering techniquesbasedonthe textual similarity
of spam emails have become ineffective.
We approach the problem of identifying spam cam-
paigns based on the premise that spam emails sent in one
campaign are disseminated autonomously by the same
mean. As a result, they must have the same goal and share
common characteristics. However, a spammer may employ
many obfuscation techniques on the subject, the content
and the embedded URL(s). For instance, we have observed
that spammers may alter the email subjects in the same
campaign, but these subjects still have the same meaning
when interpreted manually. This behavior has also been
witnessed in (Pitsillidis et al., 2010). Another observation is
that a spam email may contain a random text from a book
or a Wikipedia article (Stringhini et al., 2011). The text is
written by a human and therefore cannot be easily distin-
guished using statistical methods. Spammers also utilize
fast-ﬂux service networks and randomly generated sub-
domains (Wei et al., 2009) to obfuscate the embedded
URLs. Furthermore, spammers usually insert random
strings to the embedded URLs to confuse spam ﬁlters, or
include tracking data to verify their target email lists and
monitor their progress.
Because the obfuscation can be employed at any part of a
spam email, our spam campaign detection technique must
consider features from thewhole spam email. We chose the
features for our technique from the header, the textual
content, the embedded URL(s) and the attachment(s) of
spam emails. Our main spam campaign detection method is
based on the frequent-pattern tree (FP-Tree),which is theﬁrst
step of the FP-Growth algorithm (Han et al., 2000, 2004). The
FP-Tree techniquewas originally used by Calais et al. (2008).
However, our approach is different in terms of the features
used as well as the signals used to identify spam campaigns
from the previously constructed FP-Tree. Furthermore, we
enhance our method to detect spam campaigns on-the-ﬂy
by adopting a technique that incrementally builds the FP-
Tree (Cheung and Zaiane, 2003). A detailed explanation of
our methodology can be found in the next section.
Our software framework
As depicted in Fig. 1, the main components of our spam
campaign detection, analysis and investigation framework
are the following: Central Database
The database is carefully chosen so that it is scalable,
ﬂexible and able to store relationships between different
entities. Section 4.1 elucidates our choice.
 Parsing and Features Extraction
This component parses spam emails, extracts and stores
their features in the central database for further analysis.
More details about this component are given in Section 4.2.
 Spam Campaign Detection
This module takes the features from the central data-
base as its inputs, identiﬁes spam campaigns and saves
them back into the database. Section 4.3 explains this
module thoroughly.
 Spam Campaign Characterization
This component gives insights into spam campaigns to
further reduce the analysis time and effort. We combine
different data sources, label and score spam campaigns to
help investigators quickly grasp the objective of a campaign
and concentrate on what they are after. This component is
described in detail in Section 4.4.
Central database
Due to the tremendous number of spam emails, NoSQL
databases such as document-based ones are considered
instead of the traditional SQL-based RDBMS. Document-
oriented databases are acknowledged for their ﬂexibility
and high scalability. However, most of them do not have a
powerful query language like SQL. Moreover, the ability to
represent relationships between spam emails, spam cam-
paigns, IP addresses and domain names is essential. These
relationships can be stored and processed efﬁciently in a
graph database, which is based on graph theory. In our
system, we employ OrientDB (OrientDB, 2013), which is an
open-source NoSQL database management system. Ori-
entDB has the ﬂexibility of document-based databases as
well as the capability of graph-based ones for managing
relationships between records. It has the advantages of
being fast, scalable and supports SQL-styled queries. Spam
emails are stored in the database as documents with
different ﬁelds, such as header ﬁelds, textual content,
embedded URL(s), etc. Additionally, spam campaigns, IP
addresses, domain names and attachments are also saved
as different document types. For each document type, the
database maintains a hash table of a speciﬁc ﬁeld to elim-
inate duplications. The database also stores the relation-
ships between different documents, such as between spam
emails and spam campaigns, spam emails and attachments
or spam campaigns and IP addresses.
Parsing and feature extraction
Our parser takes spam emails, each of which consists of
a header and a body, as its inputs. The header has many
different ﬁelds, which are name/value pairs separated by
Fig. 1. Architecture of our software framework.
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Relevant features needed for the analysis are extracted.
More precisely, we consider the following features:
 Content Type: The ﬁrst part of the Content-Type header
ﬁeld describes the MIME types of the email: text/plain,
text/html, application/octet-stream, multipart/alterna-
tive, multipart/mixed, multipart/related and multipart/
report.
 Character Set: The encoding of a spam email can be
extracted from the header ﬁelds or inferred from the
email content. This encoding roughly represents the
spam email language. This feature is rarely obfuscated
by spammers due to the fact that spam emails must be
decoded successfully to be read.
 Subject: The whole subject line is considered as a
feature. If the subject is encoded using Q-encoding, it is
decoded into Unicode.
 Email Layout: In the case of text/plain, the layout is a
sequence of characters “T”, “N” and “U”, which stand for
text, newline and URL, respectively. For text/html, the
layout is the top three levels of the DOM tree. For
multipart emails, we use the tree structure of the email
body to form the layout.
 URL Tokens: The embedded URLs of spam emails are split
into tokens: the hostname, the path and the parameters.
Each token is considered as a feature.
 Attachment Name(s): Each attachment name is consid-
ered as a feature.
Spam campaign detection
Our spam campaign detection method is based on the
Frequent-pattern tree (FP-Tree) (Han et al., 2000, 2004). We
employ the FP-Tree based on the premise that the more
frequent an attribute is, the more it is shared among spam
emails. Less frequent attributes usually correspond to the
parts that are obfuscated by spammers. Thus, building anFP-Tree from email features allows spam emails to be
grouped into campaigns. Furthermore, obfuscated features
are discovered naturally within the FP-Tree and therefore
exposing the strategies of spammers. Two scans of the
dataset are needed to construct the FP-Tree. The cost of
inserting a feature vector fv into the FP-Tree is O(jf vj),
where jf vj indicates the number of features in fv. The FP-
Tree usually has a smaller size than the dataset since
feature vectors that share similar features are grouped
together. Hence, this structure reduces the amount of data
that needs to be processed. In the following, we present our
FP-Tree-based spam campaign detection algorithms.
Frequent-pattern tree construction
We deﬁne two data structures, FPTree and FPNode:
 The FPTree has one root and one method:
e The root is an FPNode labeled null.
e The add(transaction) method (Algorithm 1) accepts a
feature vector as its only parameter.
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e The tree property indicates the FPTree of this FPNode.
e The item property represents the feature.
e The root property is True if this FPNode is the root; False
if otherwise.
e The leaf property is True if this FPNode is a leaf; False if
otherwise.
e The parent property indicates the FPNode that is the
parent of this FPNode.
e The children property is a list of FPNodes that are the
children of this FPNode.
e The siblings property is a list of FPNodes that are the
siblings of this FPNode.
e The add(node) method adds the FPNode “node” as a
child of this FPNode and adds this FPNode as the parent
of the FPNode “node”.
e The search(item) method checks to see if this FPNode
has a child “item”.
We build the FP-Tree by creating the null FPNode, which
is the root of the tree, and adding the feature vectors
individually. The features in each feature vector are sorted
in descending order based on their occurrences in the
dataset. Algorithm 2 comprehensively demonstrates this
process.At the end, we obtain the FP-Tree, in which each node
represents a feature extracted from spam emails. Each path
fromone leaf to the root represents the feature vector of each
spam message. From the FP-Tree, we can see that two mes-
sages that have some common features share a portion of the
path to the root. We use this characteristic to cluster spam
emails,whichhaveseveral commonfeatures, intocampaigns.
Spam campaign identiﬁcation
From the constructed FP-Tree, we extract spam cam-
paigns by traversing the tree using the depth-ﬁrst searchmethod. When visiting each node, we check for the
following conditions:
1. The number of children of that node must be greater
than the threshold min_num_children.
2. The average frequency of the children of that node must
be greater than the threshold freq_threshold.
3. In the path from that node to the root, there must be one
node that does not have its feature type in the
n_obf_features list.
4. The number of leaves of the sub-tree starting from that
node must be greater than a threshold
min_num_messages.
If a node satisﬁes all of the above conditions, all the
leaves of the sub-tree that have that node as root are the
spam emails of a spam campaign. We store the campaign,
delete the sub-tree and continue the process until all the
remaining nodes in the tree are visited.
The FP-Tree technique is very efﬁcient and naturally
reveals the features that are common in the spam emails of
a campaign as well as the features that are obfuscated by
spammers (Calais et al., 2008). However, the disadvantage
of this technique is that it only works with a static set of
data. It has been demonstrated that spam campaigns may
last for a long period of time (Pathak et al., 2009). Conse-
quently, the ability to identify spam campaigns in their
early stage gives investigators an upper hand in their pur-
suit of the spammers. We improve our FP-Tree-based spam
campaign identiﬁcation algorithm by constructing the FP-
Tree on-the-ﬂy. We extract feature vectors from spam
emails as soon as they arrive and insert those vectors into
the tree. In the following, we provide more details about
this process.
Incremental FP-Tree
Since the FP-Tree approach (Han et al., 2000, 2004) was
proposed for mining frequent patterns, many studies have
been conducted to improve the functionality (Kai-Sang
Leung, 2004) as well as the performance (Ong et al.,
2003) of this technique. Moreover, some FP-Tree-based
incremental mining algorithms have been proposed
(Cheung and Zaiane, 2003; Leung et al., 2007). We adopt
the ideas from (Cheung and Zaiane, 2003) to construct the
incremental FP-Tree as follows:
1. Create a null root.
2. Each new transaction is added starting from the root
level.
3. At each level:
(a) The items of the new transaction are comparedwith the
items of the children nodes.
(b) If the new transaction and the children nodes have
items in common, the node having the highest count is
chosen to merge with the item in the transaction. Thus,
the count of that node is increased by 1. The item of the
merged node is then removed from the transaction. If
the count of a descendant node becomes higher than
the count of its ancestor, the descendant node has to be
Table 1
Statistics of the dataset.
1 year 1 month
(Apr. 2012eMar. 3013) (Apr. 2013)
Messages 678,095 100,339
Unique IP addresses 91,370 16,055
Unique hostnames 321,549 74,833
Unique attachments 5537 393
Table 3
Distribution of ’raw’ MIME types (1 year).
MIME type Count Percentage
text/plain 353,774 52.1431%
text/html 213,578 31.4795%
multipart/alternative 73,436 10.8238%
multipart/mixed 32,797 4.8340%
multipart/related 2,134 0.3145%
multipart/report 1,878 0.2768%
text/htmlynytcharset ¼ “windows-1252” 131 0.0193%
text/htmlynytcharset ¼ “windows-1250” 127 0.0187%
text/htmlynytcharset ¼ “iso-8859-2” 126 0.0186%
text/htmlynytcharset ¼ “us-ascii” 125 0.0184%
text/htmlynytcharset ¼ “iso-8859-1” 108 0.0159%
application/octet-stream 75 0.0111%
text/plain charset ¼ utf-8 35 0.0052%
text/plain charset ¼ us-ascii 29 0.0043%
text/plain charset ¼ “us-ascii” 28 0.0041%
text/plain charset ¼ “utf-8” 26 0.0038%
text/plain charset ¼ “iso-8859-1” 25 0.0037%
text/plain charset ¼ iso-8859-1 25 0.0037%
text/plainynytcharset ¼ “windows-1252” 4 0.0006%
text/plainynytcharset ¼ “us-ascii” 3 0.0004%
text/plainynytcharset ¼ “iso-8859-2” 1 0.0001%
text/plainynytcharset ¼ “iso-8859-1” 1 0.0001%
text/plainynytcharset ¼ “windows-1250” 1 0.0001%
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in the transaction.
(c) This process is repeated recursively with the remainder
of the new transaction.
4. Any remaining items in the new transaction are added as
a new branch to the last merged node.
5. Run the spam campaign detection process regularly to
detect new campaigns or merge with the existing ones.
Spam campaign characterization
Grouping spam emails into campaigns has greatly
reduced the amount of data that needs to be analyzed.
However, when examining a speciﬁc spam campaign, an
investigator still needs to skim through a signiﬁcant num-
ber of spam emails to grasp the essential information.
Therefore, a summary of the spam content is valuable to the
investigator. We employ techniques to automatically label
spam campaigns to give the investigator an overall view of
them. We also develop a scoring mechanism to rank spam
campaigns so that the investigator can concentrate on the
highly-ranked ones. Additionally, spam campaigns may
reveal some characteristics that are hiddenwhen analyzing
spam emails separately. For example, the relationships
between different domains and IP addresses or between
spamming servers. Therefore, we utilize and correlate
various kinds of information, such as WHOIS information,
passive DNS data, geo-location and malware database, to
assist investigators in tracing spammers. Moreover, we
employ visualization tools to illustrate the relationships
between spam emails, spam campaigns, domains and IP
addresses. The visualization helps to emphasize critical
information in the dataset, for instance, an aggressive
spamming IP address. In the following, we provide more
details about our characterization methods.Table 2
Distribution of ‘raw’ MIME types (1 month).
MIME type Count Percentage
text/html 52,596 50.2345%
text/plain 32,977 31.49.54%
multipart/alternative 16,270 15.5395%
multipart/mixed 2465 2.3543%
multipart/related 264 0.2521%
multipart/report 60 0.0573%
text/htmlynytcharset ¼ “windows-1250” 19 0.0181%
text/htmlynytcharset ¼ “us-ascii” 15 0.0143%
text/htmlynytcharset ¼ “iso-8859-1” 14 0.0134%
text/htmlynytcharset ¼ “windows-1252” 13 0.0124%
text/htmlynytcharset ¼ “iso-8859-2” 8 0.0076%
application/octet-stream 1 0.0010%Correlation module
In this module, we utilize WHOIS information
(Harrenstien et al., 1985; Daigle, 2004) and passive DNS
data, received from a trusted third party, to gain more in-
sights into the domain names found in spam emails.
WHOIS information is associated with each second-level
domain while passive DNS data gives the historical re-
lationships between hostnames and IP addresses along
with their time-stamps. In addition, we use geo-location
and malware data to add valuable information to the IP
addresses that we have found in spam campaigns. The IP
addresses can be extracted from the Received header
ﬁelds or from the passive DNS data.
Spam campaign labeling
We propose techniques for labeling spam campaigns to
provide an overview of their content. First, we employ an
automatic labeling technique that has been proposed by
Lau et al. (Lau et al., 2011). Even though this method works
in some cases, it is not scalable because of the large number
of queries to Wikipedia. Thus, we apply another method
that utilizes Wikipedia Miner toolkit (Milne and Witten,
2013), which stores summarized versions of Wikipedia in
ofﬂine databases. We create a Spam Campaign Labeling
Server, which listens to a speciﬁc network port, using theTable 4
Distribution of the correct MIME types.
MIME type 1 year 1 month
text/html 353,952 52.1694% 52,665 50.3004%
text/plain 214,195 31.5704% 32,977 31.4954%
multipart/alternative 73,436 10.8238% 16,270 15.5395%
multipart/mixed 32,797 4.8340% 2465 2.3543%
multipart/related 2134 0.3145% 264 0.2521%
multipart/report 1878 0.2768% 60 0.0573%
application/octet-stream 75 0.0111% 1 0.0010%
Fig. 2. Visualization of the FP-Tree constructed from a one-day spam data.
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words from the content of spam emails in a campaign and
feed them to the Spam Campaign Labeling Server. The
response, which contains a list of relevant topics of that
spam campaign, is saved back into the central database.Fig. 3. Visualization of one part oSpam campaign scoring
In most cases, investigators only need to pursue a
particular objective in their investigations. Therefore, we
suggest a method that has been veriﬁed by a law enforce-
ment ofﬁcial to assign each spam campaign a score. The
score of each campaign is determined by the sum of various
weighted elements. Each element is the count of an attri-
bute, a characteristic or a signal that may appear in spam
emails of a campaign. For example, an investigator who is
interested in spammers targeting Canadians may want to
putmore effort into spamcampaigns that have “.ca” domain
names in the email addresses of the recipients. We imple-
ment the attributes both from our speculation and from the
advice of a Canadian law enforcement ofﬁcial. Some of the
signals are Canadian IP addresses, “.ca” top-level domain
names, IP ranges of Canadian corporations, etc.
Results
In this section, we present the results of our spam
campaign analysis. We also show some visualizations that
can provide investigators with a spectacular view of the
spam campaigns to further understand the behaviors of
spammers.
The dataset
Table 1 shows some statistics of our spam dataset that
we received from a trusted third party. Table 2 and Table 3f the frequent-pattern tree.
Table 5
Processing time.
1 year 1 month
Parsing time 10885.2 s 2467.3 s
Feature extracting time 204.6 s 78.0 s
FP-Tree building time 36.7 s 7.8 s
Campaign detecting time 35.5 s 5.4 s
Table 6
Distribution of the decisive features used to identify spam campaigns.
Feature 1 year 1 month
Layout 2,778 641
Hostname 1,036 190
Subject 1,160 134
URL 602 106
Attachment 108 15
Character set 3 2
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MIME type and the character set are rarely obfuscated by
spammers. However, spam messages may not follow the
standard rules, which leads to the appearance of some non-
standard MIME types. This valuable signal can be used to
detect spam emails that are generated by the same auto-
matic mean. The distribution of the correct MIME types is
shown in Table 4.Spam campaign detection
Fig. 2 depicts a full FP-Tree that is built using a one-day
spam data (Data-Driven Documents) (CodeFlower Source
code visualization). This ﬁgure clearly shows groups of
nodes inside the FP-Tree, proving that the spam emails can
be grouped into spam campaigns by using the FP-Tree
structure. Fig. 3 illustrates a part of the FP-Tree that weFig. 4. Relation between the FP-Tree featuhave built (Data-Driven Documents). The node labeled
“TTTTTNN” represents the layout of the emails. We can
clearly see that all the spam emails of the campaign share
the same MIME type (“text/plain”), the same character set
(“windows-1250”) and the same layout (“TTTTTNN”). How-
ever, they have different subject lines although those sub-
jects have the same meaning (about stock markets).
Table 5 shows the time needed to extract spam cam-
paigns from our dataset. The program runs on a server that
has the Intel® Xeon® X5660 (2.80 GHz) CPU and 32 GB of
memory. The most time-consuming task is the parsing of
spam email ﬁles to insert into the main database (around
3 h for one-year data and 40 min for one-month data). The
remaining steps only take around 5 min for one-year data
and 1 min 30 s for one-month data to complete. We use
one-year data just to demonstrate the efﬁciency of the FP-
Tree method. The following sections present the results
using one-month data.
FP-tree features
In Table 6, we show the critical features that are used to
identify spam campaigns. Moreover, we perform amore in-
depth analysis of the relation between the decisive features
and the parameters of our spam campaign detection algo-
rithm. The process is as follows:
 First, the min_num_messages parameter is ﬁxed to 5.
 For each step, the min_num_children parameter is
increased by 1 (from 2 to 20). The number of detected
spam campaigns corresponding to the decisive features
are recorded 8 times (when the freq_threshold param-
eter is set to 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 3.5, 4.0, 4.5 and 5.0,
respectively). The freq_threshold of 1.5 means that the
average frequency of the children nodes is larger or
equal to 1.5 times the frequency of the current node.
The results of this analysis are shown in Fig. 4.res and the algorithm's parameters.
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Fig. 5. Spam campaign text similarity scores.
Fig. 6. Five spam campaigns that have the highest scores and less than 1000
emails
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After spam campaigns have been identiﬁed using the FP-
Tree,we calculate the text similarity scores of each campaign.
We apply three measurements to generate three similarity
scoresof all theemailpairs ineachcampaign:w-shinglingand
the Jaccard coefﬁcient (Broder et al., 1997), Context Triggered
Piecewise Hashing (CTPH) (Kornblum, 2006) and Locality-
Sensitive Hashing (LSH) (Damiani et al., 2004). A spam
campaign has three similarity scores, each of which is the
average score of eachmethod. Fig. 5 shows the results of this
process. The vertical axis represents the score of each metric
while the horizontal axis is the campaigns sorted by their
scores. Table 7 summarizes the results.
Calculating text similarity between messages in each
spam campaign is a very time-consuming process. It takes
13,339.6 s (around 3 h 42 min), 3942.5 s (around 65 min)
and 584,486 s (nearly one week) to complete the calcula-
tion of the w-shingling method, the Context Triggered
Piecewise Hashing method and the Locality-Sensitive
Hashing method, respectively.
Spam campaign characterization
In this subsection, we present some characteristics of
the spam campaigns identiﬁed from a one-month data. In
Fig. 6, we show the spam campaigns along with the spam
messages, the related IP addresses and the related host-
names. We select top 5 spam campaigns (with big numbers
in the ﬁgure) that have the highest scores and have less
than 1000messages for the purpose of this illustration. The
scores are computed based on some criteria that have been
mentioned in our spam campaign scoring method. In Fig. 7,
a word cloud, which illustrates the topics of the spam
campaigns, is presented.
Conclusion
Spam campaigns act as the pivotal instrument for
several cyber-based criminal activities. Consequently, theTable 7
Summary of campaign text similarity scores.
w-s CTPH LSH
>¼50% 598 54.96% 595 54.69% 859 78.95%
100% 265 24.36% 206 18.93% 260 23.90%
0% 20 1.84% 46 4.23% 0 0.00%
No text 10 0.92% 10 0.92% 10 0.92%analysis of spam campaigns is a critical task for cyber se-
curity ofﬁcers. In this paper, we propose a software
framework for spam campaign detection, analysis and
investigation. The framework provides law enforcement
ofﬁcials with a platform to conduct investigations on cyber
crimes. Our system greatly reduces investigation efforts by
consolidating spam emails into campaigns. Moreover, it
aids investigators by providing various information about
spam campaigns. Spam campaign characteristics are also
unveiled by labeling spam campaigns and correlatingFig. 7. Topics of spam campaigns.
S. Dinh et al. / Digital Investigation 12 (2015) S12eS21 S21different data sources. Additionally, we employ a feature-
rich and scalable database to handle a large number of
spam emails, a scoring mechanism to highlight severe
spam campaigns and a visualization tool to further assist
investigators. Our system has been adopted by a govern-
mental organization and used by law enforcement ofﬁcials
to pursuit spammers, take down spamming servers and
reduce spam volume.
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